were based on a misunderstanding of the very foundations of a market economy. Furthermore, the policies prescribed by the western economists, who lacked the understanding of the political process of reform in those transition economies, failed to take into account the fundamentals of reform processes. 2 Likewise, in Chile, a similar mistake was made when the dogmatic hands-off policy was the guiding principle for financial liberalization in 1973-82 (Visser and van Herpt 1996) .
Whether a similar mistake was made in the Asian economies is the subject matter of this volume. Following Stiglitz's analysis of the reform experiences of the transition economies, we might offer two reasons why financial liberalization in Asia failed to deliver its promised result. The first is that financial reform in Asia might have been guided by a misunderstanding of how financial markets operate in developing countries and therefore how they should be reformed. It is possible that in many of the Asian economies financial liberalization might have been perceived and practiced as a simple mirror image of financial repression (Kaul 1999) . Thus, financial liberalization might have been regarded merely as deregulation of interest rates, privatization of public financial institutions and promotion of competition in financial markets, elimination of directed credit, and removal of foreign exchange controls. If this were the case, then the reforming countries were not adequately prepared in terms of the preconditions necessary for successful financial liberalization.
The second possible reason for the failure of the reforms is that even if the blueprint for reform was a correct one, its implementation might have strayed away from its true course because of pressures from various interest groups. For instance, according to Park (1998) , developing countries were pressured by western governments to open their domestic capital markets for foreign investment. This pressure persisted even though the western governments knew that the accounting practices and disclosure requirements in developing countries did not conform to the accepted standards and that the supervisory authorities of those countries did not enforce rules and regulations as tightly as they should.
The following section presents a brief review of the literature on financial liberalization prior to the crisis, its purpose being to help the reader understand what ideas might possibly have guided policymakers in Asia. It is followed in Section III by a summary discussion of what actually happened in financial reform in eight Asian countries selected for comparison. Concluding remarks are presented in Section IV.
II
Financial Liberalization: From Deregulation to Institutional Reform Since 1973, when McKinnon and Shaw made their seminal contributions, academic thinking on financial liberalization has gone through several rounds of revision. Each round took place more or less as a result of a financial crisis, adding to our understanding of the scope of reforms necessary for achieving a market-oriented financial system. What was deemed necessary to establish a "liberal" financial system has progressed from that of simply removing government intervention in financial markets to that of creating institutional preconditions necessary for deregulated but efficient and stable financial markets.
Round 1: Deregulation
When McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) published their respective books in 1973, it was a common practice in many developing countries to maintain artificially low interests due to the notion that high interest rates were detrimental to economic growth. Thus the McKinnon-Shaw thesis that the artificially 4 low interest rates and the concomitant credit allocation by government, i.e., "financial repression," impeded economic growth was a radical departure from the normal practices of financial policy then carried out in most developing countries. Given the intuitive plausibility of the proposition that freeing interest rates from government control will increase saving and bring about an efficient allocation of credit and a higher rate of economic growth, the McKinnon-Shaw thesis had a powerful effect on shaping the financial policy for economic development.
The first real-life test of the McKinnon-Shaw thesis came when Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay embarked upon the wholesale implementation of financial liberalization policies in the late 1970s. Unfortunately for those countries, the outcome of the reforms was not the expected sound and efficient market-ordered financial system. What emerged, instead, was "de facto public guarantees to depositors, lenders and borrowers, and no effective supervision and control (until it was too late) of the practices of financial intermediaries" (Diaz-Alejandro 1985, p.1) . With such a financial regime in place those three countries suffered sky-rocketing interest rates, bankruptcy of many solvent firms, and eventually a financial crisis in 1982.
Round 2: Macroeconomic Stability and Imperfect Financial Markets
This disastrous consequence, of what later became to be known as the Southern Cone experiment, prompted research in the 1980s and early 1990s into the reasons for the failure (IMF 1983 , Khan and Zahler 1985 , Fry 1988 , McKinnon 1991 . One outcome of much soul searching on the part of the proponents of financial liberalization was a new consensus that the Southern Cone experiment was a failure, not because the idea of financial liberalization per se was wrong, but because it was implemented in an environment unsuited for its success.
McKinnon (1988, p.387-8) was one of the first to point out the importance of macroeconomic stability as a condition for the successful outcome of financial liberalization. Fry (1988) also focused on the necessity of stable macroeconomic policy but added a sound regulatory framework as one of the preconditions for successful financial liberalization. He was, however, cognizant of the difficulty of creating such a regulatory framework in the developing countries where human capital and knowledgeable auditors or supervisors were in short supply.
McKinnon (1991) gave perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of the correct sequencing of financial liberalization. While arguing that his initial policy prescriptions were not incorrect, he now added that a certain sequence of economic reform should be followed if financial liberalization is to be successful. The first step of this sequence is appropriate macroeconomic policy, which includes fiscal control, balancing the government budget, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and ensuring an adequate internal revenue service for the purpose of tax collection.
The second step in the sequence is the liberalization of domestic financial markets by allowing interest rates to be determined freely by the market, freeing up onerous reserve requirements, and privatizing the banks. This step also includes the establishment of commercial law and the liberalization of domestic trade. McKinnon proposes that the privatization of banks may come near the end of this step because this can only occur after the proper re-capitalization of bad loans.
Step three includes the liberalization of foreign exchanges, which includes the liberalization of the exchange rate for current account transactions and the liberalization of tariffs, quotas, and other international trade restrictions. Only in the final step are international capital flows to be liberalized. So, while the goal of financial liberalization-the establishment of a market-based financial system-remained the same, the process necessary to achieve that goal was no longer regarded simply as that of doing away with government intervention in financial markets. It was now regarded as a more complex process requiring proper sequencing and macroeconomic stability as a precondition for its success (e.g., Cho and Khatkhate 1989, Jungsoo Lee 1991). 3 Paralleling this progress in the literature on financial liberalization was a new development in the theoretical literature on financial markets due primarily to the contributions made by Joseph Stiglitz. Starting with a basic premise that financial transactions are more severely constrained by asymmetric and imperfect information and costly contract enforcement than commodity transactions, Stigliz (1989) argues that financial markets do not operate as in a textbook model of supply and demand. Adverse selection, moral hazard, and contract enforcement are inherent characteristics of financial markets and, consequently, credit-and equity-rationing may occur even in competitive financial markets that are free of government intervention. In other words, according to Stiglitz, market failure is an inherent characteristic of financial markets.
Credit-rationing by banks-allocation of credit at interest rates below a market-clearing ratemay occur because of the asymmetry of information and the risk-aversion of banks (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) . In other words, instead of making loans to those who are willing to pay highest interest rates, banks may prefer making loans to "safe" projects at a lower-than-the market-clearing rate. Such a banking practice will exclude high-risk, high-return projects from being funded by banks, and unless there are well-functioning equity markets, the country will miss out on the opportunity to establish some high-return projects. For many developing countries that lack well-functioning equity markets, financial liberalization may thus lead to an inefficient allocation of financial resources (Cho 1986) .
But, even if there are well-functioning equity markets, there may be some rationing of funds, equity-rationing, which limits raising capital in the equity market. Since with imperfect information the equity market will not be able to differentiate good from bad issues, the market will generally discount the prices of good stock issues (Stiglitz 1989) . Unwilling to see their net worth decrease, "good" firms will be reluctant to issue new shares and will rely more on internal financing for capacity expansion or new projects. This is less than an optimum arrangement since with perfect information the firm would have gone to the equity market to raise additional capital.
The limited use of the equity market for raising funds due to imperfect information is more serious for developing than developed countries as, in the former, their equity markets are generally less developed and their economies are subject to greater uncertainty, particularly where the political system is unstable. Furthermore, the small scale of business enterprises in most developing countries implies greater difficulty in collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information, which poses problems for financial intermediaries. Small firms also lack the scale to maintain their own internal capital market capable of allocating funds efficiently among diverse subunits. Yet even when firms are large, the relative weakness of regulatory institutions impedes full disclosure and the adequate provision of information to the market.
Round 3: Institutional Preconditions
The new insight into the operation of financial markets led, in the early 1990s, to a new round of debate on financial liberalization with the focus shifting from government to market failure (Akyuz 1993 , Villanueva and Mirakhor 1990 , Caprio 1994 , Gertler and Rose 1994 , Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998 , Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1998 . This debate led to the general conclusion that the developing countries do not have the institutions necessary for free-market policies and that such institutions do not come into being quickly and spontaneously. The implication is clear: institutions necessary for a market economy must be created prior to financial liberalization. 4 Such institution building requires government activism. Thus, Villanueva and Mirakhor (1990) point to the importance of institutional reform prior to financial liberalization by calling for the development of financial "infrastructure" such as adequate legal and accounting systems, credit appraisal and rating, and adequate channels for the flow of information. Likewise, Gertler and Rose (1994) propose that the government should focus its attention on creating an efficient system of contract enforcement as well as a viable borrowing class. They argue that financial liberalization should be coordinated with policies promoting growth and stability of the real sector, as such policies would increase the creditworthiness of borrowers.
Increasing recognition of the importance of institutions such as the legal, supervisory and regulatory systems and the importance of building such institutions as a precondition for financial liberalization has led to the realization that institutions are historical products and, as such, institutionbuilding is a path-dependent process. Thus a recent World Bank study on the relationship between financial and real sectors, the process of reform, and the effect of reform on the mobilization of savings and the efficiency of resource allocation concludes that financial reform is not an all-or-none choice and thus cannot follow a rigid or unique sequence (Caprio, Jr., et al. 1994) . Which strategy and sequencing a country adopts in reforming its financial system depends on its initial conditions and the speed of institution building. As a matter of fact, another World Bank study on financial reform concludes that "...recommendations for any country's financial system need to be 'tuned' to the institutions and culture of the country" (Caprio, Jr. and Vittas 1997, p.3). 5 According to Caprio (1994) , the outcome of financial reform depends on several initial conditions present in the economy when regulations are lifted. First, it is dependent on the overall net worth of banks and the initial mix of their assets at the time of reform. If banks have low or no net worth prior to reform, their behavior according to the new set of rules will likely be risky as it is in their interest to make high-risk loans to regain profitability. If banks have high net worth, they have the incentive to protect it by acting in a risk-averse way. The initial mix of assets in a bank is also important because, being freed of former constraints, the bank is inclined to make a portfolio shift in favor of the asset that has been discriminated against by the former intervention. For example, if the existing regulations are on investment in the real estate sector it is likely the banks will diversify into that sector when those regulations are lifted.
Second, the success of financial reform depends on the initial stock of human capital as bankers need to have skills in risk assessment and the ability to gather information about new potential credits if they are to make correct loan decisions. Third, it is dependent on the initial stock of information capital, which in turn depends on the existence of audited financial statements, developed equity markets, and the level of acquisition of public and client-specific information. The fourth requirement for successful financial reform is the existence of a system of rules and procedures for the implementation of decisions within banks. As pointed out by Caprio (1994; 61) , these requirements are not implemented overnight as their development requires time and diligence. Caprio (1997) acknowledges that financial reform in practice has come to mean the transformation of the financial system to mimic the financial systems of the OECD countries. As he put it, "...the reformers virtually always take as given the goal, namely, to move their financial systems toward the general model that has been adopted in most OECD countries today" (p.1). He warns, however, that such a model is premised on the existence of rich institutional environments and "world-class" supervisory systems, which most of the emerging market countries lack. These countries will have to develop their own financial systems. There are no magic cures that "…would alone suffice to ensure a dynamic and efficient financial system in which all deposits are safe, all loans are performing, all good investment projects are financed, and all bad ones rejected" (p.3). Whatever system may develop, it will have to be "tuned" to the institutions and culture of that country. Harwood (1997) also reaches a similar conclusion, arguing the necessity of paying attention to a country's unique political, economic, sociological, legal and institutional conditions in the development of its financial system. This brief review of the literature on financial liberalization shows that there has been a progressive widening of the definition of financial liberalization in each of the successive rounds of debate on the topic, each round triggered by either the failure of financial liberalization in achieving its intended goals or new theoretical insights into the workings of financial markets. In the 1970s, the debate on financial liberalization focused on deregulation and the free-market determination of interest rates. In the 1980's, the debate focused on the proper sequencing in financial reform with a focus on macroeconomic stability as a precondition for successful financial liberalization. In the 1990s, the focus was shifted to market failures and the institutions that are necessary for successful financial liberalization but are lacking in many developing countries. In other words, even before the Asian crisis of 1997-98, serious writings on financial liberalization no longer took the textbook model of supply and demand as the norm for the financial market and regarded financial liberalization as that of simply doing away with government intervention.
III
Summary of the Country Studies The eight Asian countries selected for study of their experiences in financial reform and the possible linkage to the crisis are Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Japan, China, and India. Countries such as Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia suffered badly from the crisis whereas others such as Japan, China, and India escaped from the crisis with no significant effect on their economies. The following summarizes the diverse experiences of the eight countries reported in the subsequent chapters.
Thailand
Financial liberalization in Thailand began in the early 1990s when the government abolished interest ceilings and promoted the development of capital and bond markets. As part of financial liberalization Thailand also accepted, in May 1990, the Article VIII of the IMF Agreements, thus relaxing exchange controls and reducing restrictions on capital account transactions.
One consequence of these deregulatory measures was a rapid increase in overseas borrowing by banks in Thailand. In 1987-90, a few years prior to the capital account opening, the Thai banks accounted for 14.7 percent of the country's net private foreign capital inflows, but by 1995-96 their share went up to 49 percent-more than a three-fold increase in less than a decade. Foreign borrowing of the non-bank sector also increased from less than 2 percent to 22 percent during the same period. In contrast, during the same period the share of foreign direct investment in Thailand decreased from 25 percent to 8.5 percent.
As part of financial liberalization the Thai government established, in 1993, the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBFs) with offers of various tax incentives. It was hoped that the establishment of BIBFs would turn Bangkok into a regional banking center that would replace Hong Kong and Singapore. They were also expected mainly to raise overseas funds for financing trade and investment outside of Thailand. As Bhanupong Nidhiprabha points out, much of the money raised abroad was, however, lent to borrowers in Thailand who in turn invested it mostly in the nontraded goods sector.
Throughout the 1980s Thailand experienced a high rate of growth in exports and income, which generated expectations of continued economic prosperity. Such expectations, fueled with credit expansion by financial institutions, led to a bubble in the markets for land and stocks. Further fueling the bubble were the huge inflows of foreign capital that followed the capital account opening and the establishment of BIBFs.
Bhanupong argues that the opening of the capital account prior to establishing prudential regulations and especially the establishment of the BIBFs were a major policy blunder for Thailand. According to him, local financial institutions in Thailand were ill prepared to handle the large size of capital inflows that the country experienced and its capital account opening was, therefore, premature. What Thailand should have done was to first develop sound financial institutions, markets and policy instruments before opening the capital account.
The IMF certainly played a role in Thailand's decision to carry out financial liberalization. But, more influential in that decision were, according to Bhanupong, the domestic players such as central and commercial bankers and independent think-tank economists who walked in and out from the public domain of regulators and private financial institutions. It appears that these central bankers and bankersturned finance ministers all shared the IMF's ethos of free market ideology. If the policies they helped implement are any evidence of their thinking on what constitutes financial liberalization, it appears that they had not been well informed of the more recent developments in the literature on financial liberalization.
Indonesia
Until Indonesia became engulfed in a crisis in 1997 it had all the outward signs of a healthy economy-a moderate rate of inflation, relatively low interest rates, and a relatively stable rupiah exchange rate. Although such macroeconomic indicators were often cited as signs of sound economic fundamentals they were in reality largely artificial phenomena created by implicit and explicit government subsidies. Massive capital inflows also helpted camouflage an economy burdened with large external debts and a fragile banking system. What appeared to be a high rate of economic growth in the early 1990s was mostly associated with unproductive investments in "strategic industries" and the non-traded goods sector. Those investments were largely financed by massive capital inflows that followed the banking sector reform in October 1988.
Indonesia's total external debt as of March 1997 was $135 billion, nearly triple of the debt in 1989, and was equivalent to 160 percent of the country's annual GDP. Over 60 percent of the debt was owed by the private sector with 90 percent of its debt being of short-term maturity. Thus, by 1997 Indonesia became highly vulnerable to a currency crisis, which is exactly what happened when foreign lenders refused to roll over the country's huge short-term debt.
The driving force behind economic reform in Indonesia was the "technocrats," the highly trained economists working in the Ministry of Finance and Planning Agency. With the support from the central bank and with little opposition from major groups in the country they were able to carry out a number of economy-wide reforms. The general public also supported the reforms since they generally had favorable effects on inflation, employment and economic growth. Even the politically powerful business groups in the highly protected sectors of the economy went along with the reforms as they could now take advantage of liberalized capital markets and implicit guarantees on external borrowing. They also benefited from the privatization of state-owned enterprises, "strategic industries," and public utilities.
According to Anwar Nasution, the "technocrats" supported financial liberalization because they believed that a greater presence of foreign financial institutions would bring in more external savings, advanced technologies and expertise; increase domestic competition and improve the corporate culture; and improve the efficiency of financial resource allocation. What actually happened was, however, a rapid credit expansion and investments in "strategic industries" and the non-traded sector. Furthermore, increased competition from the new entrants put pressure on the existing financial institutions to take on riskier projects when many of their credit officers did not have the expertise necessary for evaluating new sources of credit and market risks. As a result, the projects that tended to be funded by the banks were investments in land, buildings and other tangible goods, which could be used as collateral.
Indonesia is a country with an adequate provision of prudential rules and regulations as it has adopted many of such rules and regulations since 1991 upon recommendations made by the Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices under the auspices of the BIS. What it has failed to do in a commensurate manner was to strengthen the legal and accounting systems that are necessary for the effective enforcement of prudential regulations and supervision. Furthermore, poor governance rooted in an unaccountable judiciary and a corrupt government bureaucracy also contributed to the ineffective implementation of whatever prudential rules and regulations the country had adopted since 1991.
One factor that contributed to Indonesia's banking crisis was the failure to establish an appropriate exit policy to accompany the liberal entry policy that was introduced in 1988. In fact, until the crisis there was no exit policy that would allow state-owned banks to go bust, and even private banks were protected from going bankrupt if they were owned by politically well connected groups. This formal or informal no-exit policy encouraged moral hazard on the part of the banks, which resulted in their accumulation of non-performing loans. Also contributing to the accumulation of non-performing loans was government intervention in the lending decisions of state-owned banks and finance companies, which persisted in spite of the financial reform.
Korea
Korea's financial liberalization began in the early 1980s in a piecemeal manner and without a coherent strategy. Although a more serious attempt at reform was made in 1991, it was only with the inauguration of the Kim Young Sam administration that the pace of financial deregulation accelerated. One of the goals of the administration was to "internationalize" the Korean economy, and to achieve that end the government relaxed or abolished many of the restrictions on financial markets and foreign exchange transactions. Another factor behind the rapid pace of financial deregulation was the government's desire to make Korea the second Asian country to join the OECD.
In Korea, according to Yoon Je Cho, almost every group except the bureaucrats, who were averse to losing their authority over financial institutions, was in favor of financial liberalization. For the industrial firms, financial liberalization meant unlimited access to credit and a chance to establish their own financial institutions; for the bankers it was freedom from government intervention; and for the politicians it was a move away from an authoritarian government and a symbol of democratization. In spite of such widespread support for financial liberalization there was no clear consensus on what financial liberalization constituted of and how it should be carried out. As it turned out, the determining factor of the actual course of reform and its outcome was the push-and-pull of various interest groups, both domestic and foreign, and not a well thought-out strategy for financial liberalization.
By 1997, financial reform in Korea succeeded in eliminating, more or less completely, the practice of government intervention in credit allocation and the management of commercial banks. In doing so it had the effect of weakening, if not destroying, the government-chaebol-bank co-insurance scheme that the country utilized so effectively in bringing about rapid economic development. While weakening the co-insurance scheme the reform also made it possible for chaebols to increase their control over non-bank financial institutions. The reform thus strengthening chaebols' internal capital market while weakening the banks's monitoring role in their corporate governance. It also weakened the government's capacity as an effective risk partner of corporate firms.
By 1997, typical corporate firms in Korea became heavily indebted, and in the case of some chaebols the leverage ratio reached close to 500. Such a high leverage ratio was bad enough for economic stability but what made the situation worse was that because of the large size of some chaebols no single financial institution could impose on them the necessary debt discipline. It was then commonly believed that those chaebols would not go bankrupt since the government could not afford to allow them to fall. Such perception could not have been conducive to creating the banking or credit culture in Korea.
Yoon Je Cho argues that such structural problems should have been tackled before Korea began its financial liberalization. But, as he rightly points out, before the crisis many influential observers in Korea thought that that would not be necessary since financial liberalization would automatically bring about an efficient financial system, whiöch in turn would solve many of the structural problems.
Korea's financial crisis of 1997-98 was, as Cho sees it, an inevitable consequence of the financial liberalization that had been carried out in an economy with a highly leveraged corporate sector, poorly developed financial market infrastructure, inadequate corporate governance, and a poor credit culture. Given the slowness and difficulty of reform in the real sector, Korea should have adopted a gradual approach to financial liberalization, keeping pace with reforms in the corporate sector and the regulatory regime. Or, alternatively, Korea should have implemented real sector reforms much faster or at least in tandem with financial sector reform.
The lesson from the Korean experience is, according to Cho, that financial liberalization should be regarded as a process that takes time and involves much more than deregulating financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization is a process that needs to be framed in full cognizance of the economic structure of a country, reforms in other sectors of the economy, the extent of the development of financial market structure such as accounting practice, credit analysis and rating, and supervisory capacity.
Malaysia
Compared with those in other developing countries, Malaysia's financial system is relatively well developed with its history going back to the British colonial era. Being modeled after the AngloAmerican system, the banks are restricted in their operation to accepting deposits, granting loans and other specified activities and are kept at the arm's length from corporate governance and management. But what has compromised the soundness of the Malaysian banking system was the increasing dominance of it by Bumiputera since the 1970s and the consequent use of financial policy as an instrument of inter-ethnic economic redistribution and other related public policies.
Although share trading in Malaysia goes as far back as the 1870s it was only in May 1960, when the Malaysian Stock Exchange was established, that public trading in stocks and shares began to be undertaken. Since then the stock market has become an important source of corporate finance in Malaysia, and as a matter of fact it has surpassed the commercial banks as a source of corporate finance since the early 1990s. Much of money raised in the equity market did not, however, go to productive investments as more than 50 percent of it was used in the acquisition of the existing public sector assets being privatized.
In the early 1990s the Malaysian government launched a financial market liberalization program to promote Malaysia as a major international financial center. To attract foreign capital the government allowed foreign institutional investors to acquire equity in Malaysian corporations and also reduced the tax rate on their profits to 10 percent. These measures had the effect of attracting huge amounts of portfolio investment into Malaysia in the early and mid-1990s. The Malaysian stock market then even acquired a reputation as a kind of casino with active trading fueled by a heady optimism and a frenzy of speculation over corporate takeovers.
The ringgit, the Malaysian currency, had been in effect pegged to the U.S. dollar since the1980s. But, with the strengthening of the dollar from mid-1995 there emerged a widespread sense that the ringgit had become overvalued and would consequently depreciate to RM2.7 or 2.8 per dollar. What actually happed in mid-July 1997 was a far greater depreciation, the exchange rate reaching as low as RM4.88 to the dollar in January 1998. As investors scrambled to get out of their position in the ringgit, the stock market fell severely with the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Index (KLCI) falling from 1300 in February 1997 to 500 in January 1998. According to Chin Kok Fay and Jomo, K.S., a "correction" in the currency and share markets had been well due, but ill-considered official Malaysian responses turned what should have been an inevitable correction into massive collapses of the rinngit and the KLCI.
According to Chin and Jomo, despite some erosion of financial governance from the mid-1980s a tighter regulation of the financial sector in Malaysia, compared with its neighbors, rendered the country relatively safe from vulnerability to the reversal of short-term bank loans. Instead, it was rather the success in attracting foreign portfolio investments to its stock market that increased the vulnerability of the Malaysian economy to the shifting sentiments of international investor. As a matter of fact, the bull-run of 1996 had already reversed after February 1997 as international portfolio investor sentiments toward Malaysia soured. This change in sentiments was further reinforced by contemporary developments in the region, but what made the situation worse were the inappropriate policy responses by the government and the contrarian rhetoric of the Malaysian prime minister.
Malaysia's eagerness to make itself a key financial center in Southeast Asia was not supported by a system of well-conceived prudential regulations necessary for managing the much more volatile and greater portfolio investment inflows that such a center brought about. It was also ill prepared to deal with the currency and financial crises that occurred with a sudden reversal of capital flows, and with injudicious policy responses to the crises it turned them into a crisis of the real economy.
The Philippines
The Philippine financial system managed to survive the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 relatively unscathed due to a couple of factors. First, over the preceding three years the central bank of the Philippines implemented various measures to strengthen its prudential framework and regulatory oversight over banks and to align domestic banking standards with international "best practices." It also had the banks achieve a high degree of capitalization. Second, compared with its neighbors the Philippines experienced a surge in capital inflows relatively late and in relatively small amounts. In fact, in 1996 the net foreign investment in the Philippines was only $3.5 billion, and in 1997 it actually went down to $762 million.
The small size of capital inflows was in turn largely due to two factors. First, affecting the demand side was the fact that the external debt moratorium, which had been in place since 1984, was lifted only in 1991, delaying access to foreign debt markets by the public and private sectors. Second, affecting the supply side of foreign capital was the fact that the relatively poor economic performance of the Philippines made it a less attractive place for foreign investment.
In the Philippines, interest rate deregulation began in 1980 with the lifting of interest-rate ceilings on various categories of savings and time deposits. Also beginning in 1990, the central bank started to dismantle the various measures of control that it had imposed during the economic crisis of 1984-85 and other measures that had been put in place over the preceding four decades. But, as the preceding discussion points out, various measures of financial liberalization had very little to do with the relative immunity of the Philippine economy from the crisis of 1997-98. Furthermore, as argued by Maria Gochoco-Bautista, financial liberalization in the Philippines has failed to bring about its theoretically expected outcome of a higher rate of economy growth as it was undertaken without correcting fundamental structural distortions in the economy.
In the Philippines, the long history of import substitution has created a business elite whose interests are deeply entrenched and run counter to greater market competition and liberalization. In spite of various measures of financial liberalization the market structure of the financial sector has remained basically the same: Commercial banks are still owned or controlled by large family-owned corporations that rely on short-term bank loans for their working capital and for financing of long-term investments.
The business elite behind these large family-owned corporations has influenced the outcome of financial liberalization and other reform programs to serve its own interests. In fact, financial liberalization has strengthened the monopoly power of the elite with access to bank financing. Especially during the Marcos regime many of the inefficiencies in the economy were allowed to continue since they protected the interests of Marcos and the ruling elite, whose cooperation was sought by the United States to serve its larger geopolitical interests.
The absence of genuine reforms in the economy resulted in periodic balance-of-payments crises that made the Philippines and its ruling elite to depend on external financing and aid, particularly from the IMF and the World Bank. The return of democracy after the demise of the Marcos regime did not totally erase the structural weaknesses of the past as political challenges limited the ability of the government to pursue needed reforms. The experience of the Philippines shows that simply deregulating interest rates or liberalizing the foreign exchange market and opening the capital account do not necessarily raise market competition nor change the orientation of industries from an inward-looking to an outward-looking one.
Another consequence of the favored access to bank financing by the large corporate groups was that it has allowed them to avoid going to the equity market. This has made it easier for the owners to retain their ownership control while insulating corporate management from harsh judgments of the equity market. In other words, the close ties between large corporations and banks are an instrumental factor in the perpetuation of monopolies and the resulting inefficiencies in the Philippine economy.
Gochoco-Bautista argues that breaking those ties is critical if the Philippine economy is to become more competitive and efficient and if financial liberalization is to have a better chance of success than in the past. As she sees it, breaking the ties will induce the corporations to observe good corporate governance since they will need to ensure access to loans from banks and equity capital from capital markets. It will also provide the banks with the incentive to monitor closely their clients since they will need to protect their own bottom lines.
Japan
In November 1997, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities Company went bankrupt, followed by the failure of 30 financial institutions in 1998. The failure of those two financial institutions had its origin in accumulating stresses in the Japanese financial system, which in turn resulted from the failure of its regulatory authorities to resolve the non-performing loan problem and a series of policy errors. In other words, according to Thomas Cargill, Japan's economic and financial performance in late 1997 and through 1998 was an event independent of the Asian crisis of 1997-98.
Cargill argues that although Japan began financial liberalization in the mid-1970s the reform remained incomplete as it kept some of the key elements of the pre-liberalization financial regime. The retention of those key elements plus an increased role for market forces created an environment in Japan that encouraged excessive risk taking, which, when combined with easy monetary policy, brought about the infamous bubble economy in the second half of the 1980s. According to Cargill, the fundamental structure of the Japanese financial regime and of other financial regimes modeled after the Japanese system would eventually have generated some type of economic and financial distress. In other words, even though the banking crisis in Japan and the financial crisis that afflicted other Asian economies were independent of each other, they were both an inevitable consequence of a systemic fault in their financial systems.
In Japan, neither a new market ideology nor external pressures had much to do with the way it carried out financial reform. It was mainly pressures from various domestic interest groups that brought about financial reform, and that is why certain key elements of the old financial system remained in spite of the reform. Those elements include nontransparent regulation and supervision; the "convoy system" for dealing with troubled financial institutions; pervasive government deposit guarantees; close linkages among politicians, financial institutions, and regulatory authorities; and the postal savings system and the Fiscal Loan and Investment Program.
This incomplete liberalization has led, among others, to the unraveling of the main bank system that in the past served as an effective system for evaluating and monitoring risk. No widely available financial disclosure framework was, however, made available to replace the main bank system. Furthermore, the development of the regulatory monitoring system lagged behind market developments, and administrative guidance also could not keep pace with the fast changing financial environment.
Cargill argues that for Japan to get out of its economic malaise it needs to carry out a complete financial liberalization. That would mean doing away with the elements of the pre-liberalization regime that it has retained and, according to Cargill, Japan has made significant progress in that direction but its future continues to remain uncertain.
China
China avoided the Asian financial crisis primarily because its financial system was relatively closed and "semi-repressed" with its currency inconvertible on the capital account. In addition, China had an extraordinarily strong balance of payments position in the run up to the crisis, its external debt was modest relative to its official holdings of foreign exchange, and its short-term debt accounted for only 13 percent of the total external debt. Yet China remains, according to Nicholas Lardy, vulnerable to a domestic banking crisis.
In spite of a series of financial reforms China's financial system still remains semi-repressed: the interest rate structure is distorted, banks are subject to excessive taxation, and credit is allocated bureaucratically and mostly to state-owned enterprises. Banks and other financial institutions have a weak financial condition because they have been required to lend almost exclusively to state-owned enterprises at artificially low interest rates. Further weakening the banks is the fact that the government has been using them as a major source of its revenues. On the eve of the Asian financial crisis the taxes paid by the four largest state-owned banks equaled about one-sixth of central government revenues.
China's banking system is in a precarious condition because state-owned enterprises, which are the largest recipients of bank loans, are themselves in poor financial conditions. In fact, their debt-equity ratio increased from 122 percent in 1989 to 570 in 1995, a sign that most of the bank loans were used to pay wages and taxes and to finance growing inventories of unsold or unsellable goods and not to finance fixed investment but instead.
Fiscal implications of restoring the health of the banking system are enormous. Lardy estimates the cost of doing so as 25 percent of China's GDP. This will be a significant burden on China's fiscal capability, especially given that consolidated government revenues in 1998 were only 12.4 percent of GDP, less than one half of what it would take to restore the health of the banking system. Worse, the government debt has increased dramatically in recent years with the combined value of all its debts reaching 20.5 percent of GDP. It is obvious that the situation will only get worse unless the authorities are willing to cut off the flow of new lending to unprofitable state-owned enterprises, thus ending the flow of new bad loans, and unless the banks adopt a commercial credit culture.
Lardy concludes that China's experience in the Asian financial crisis supports the view that premature capital account liberalization increases a country's vulnerability to a currency crisis. But, as he points out, it would be difficult to argue that the case of China supports the desirability of postponing financial liberalization. The current system is not sustainable, and the sooner more fundamental reforms are undertaken the better off China will be. India India's economic policy regime has gone through three distinct phases. The first phase was the era of planning from 1951 to1984 when the state had strict control over resource allocation. The second phase was a period of partial deregulation from 1985 to 1991 when the state retained a major role in resource allocation even though the private sector was given greater freedom in investment decisions. The third phase is the post-1991 period when resource allocation is primarily market determined. In this phase India has made various attempts to liberalize its financial system and open its capital account, but it has not made much progress on these fronts. Perhaps, ironically, what helped India escape from the Asian crisis with relatively little damage to its economy was the lack of progress in capital account opening, which severely limited banks' and firms' access to capital markets abroad.
Since 1991 there were two important reforms in India's financial sector-deregulation of interest rates and freeing of pricing restrictions on the new issues of shares on the stock market. In spite of these reforms, many restrictions are still in place on the banks's ability to allocate credit and the government remains the owner of all the major commercial banks.
According to Rajendra R. Vaidya, the privatization of banks in India has not progressed very far mainly due to opposition from trade unions and major political parties. What has been accomplished so far is the piecemeal disinvestment of a small portion of government shareholdings, which has had little effect on the basic character of the public sector firms. The sole objective of disinvestment appears to be that of generating revenues for the cash starved government.
The banks in India are all burdened with many non-performing assets: in 1996, about 18.7 percent of their assets is categorized as substandard, doubtful or loss. This high ratio of non-performing loans is a result of "social control" imposed on state-owned banks in the years prior to 1991. It is yet too early to tell whether financial liberalization has improved the efficiency of the banks and the quality of their assets. In India, public ownership of banks has created the mirage of invulnerability to shocks, but as the financial health of the government itself deteriorates its ability to bail out banks has come into question.
Two development banks in India-the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) and the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI)-are not actually banks as they do not take deposits from the public and as they specialize in the provision of long-term loans. Both institutions have increased their liabilities in foreign currencies (12 percent of total liabilities in 1998 for IDBI and 22 percent for ICICI) but have lent them to domestic firms with only rupee payoffs. Because of this currency mismatch these institutions are vulnerable to a shock arising from currency depreciation.
Since the mid-eighties successive governments have tried, without much success, to cut various subsidies while trying to increase the tax base or implement tax reforms. Resulting fiscal deficits have forced the government to require the banks to hold its debts at low interest rates. Such an arrangement would not have been possible if the banks were not state-owned and -controlled and were thus free to make their own portfolio decisions. The fiscal expediency of this arrangement for the government has been a deterrant to any attempt for financial liberalization in India.
Another factor that has impeded financial liberalization in India is the opposition to bank privatization by the extremely powerful labor unions that belong to the banking industry. So far they have succeeded in thwarting all moves toward bank privatization.
The banks are the weakest link in India's financial system because of the large number of nonperforming assets they currently hold. Their bankruptcy would put the entire economy under enormous strain because the government would have to render budgetary support to rescue them even when it is under a stringent budget condition itself. Cuts in spending would have to be made on social welfare such as health and education, and such a reallocation of resources would cause a severe social cost in a poverty-stricken economy like India.
IV

Conclusion: Institutional Hiatus and the Failure of Economic Reform
A general conclusion that the country studies in this volume lead to is that the countries most affected by the crisis did not have the institutional preconditions for a safe and sound, privately owned financial system. It is not, as discussed in the above review of the literature on financial liberalization, that warnings had not been given that financial liberalization needed to be preceded by such preconditions. What the studies show is that in a number of cases the policy makers appear to have been oblivious of such warnings.
It is, however, doubtful whether, even if they had not been, the policy makers would have been able to carry out financial liberalization in an orderly manner, following the right sequence. Given that those countries are still in the early stages of establishing effective, democratic political and legal systems, it would be, as pointed out by Cole and Slade (1998) , unrealistic to expect them to develop the necessary preconditions for financial liberalization in a matter of a few years. What made the situation worse was that they had been under pressure to deregulate financial markets from western governments that were, as pointed out by Park (1998) , primarily interested in getting equal access to and outright opening of financial markets for financial companies from their own countries. It is hard to imagine that, given their own domestic political agenda, those western governments would have waited for institutional preconditions to be established in the developing countries before pressuring them to open their financial markets.
The argument that there are institutional precondition necessary for financial liberalization comes as no surprise to anyone whose understanding of the workings of the market economy is not based solely on its simplistic representation typically found in economics textbooks. In fact, the importance of institutions in economic development has long been recognized since they structure political, economic, and social interactions among individual actors and thus influence the path of economic development (North 1981 , 1990 , Williamson 1985 . 6 It is also well recognized that formal institutions such as constitutions, laws, and property rights may be established in a relatively short period of time whereas informal institutions such as sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are culturespecific and slow to change. What, however, makes it difficult to carry out economic reform in a developing country is that even if formal institutions can be borrowed from more advanced economies they may not be compatible with the country's informal institutions and as a result they may not be effective.
That formal institutions need to be compatible with informal institutions for them effecitve is basically the conclusion that Lin and Nugent (1995, p. 2362) reach after an extensive review of the literature on institutions and economic development:
[M]ere transplantations of successful institutions from DCs to LDCs is, at best, unlikely to have the expected positive effects on performance, and, at worst, may have rather disastrous effects. Where to start and how to bring out the reforms in a country are questions that can be answered only with serious consideration of the country's existing institutional structure and human and physical endowments.
What this observation by Lin and Nugent suggests is that economic reform involving changes in institutions is not a task that can be simply guided by some general theory, if there is any, or sheer imitation. It will require modifying imported institutions to fit in with indigenous informal institutions or, alternatively, the informal institutions may have to change to accommodate the imported formal institutions. In the latter case it may be years, if not a generation, before the formal institutions become effective since informal institutions are slow to change. In fact, this is a conclusion reached by some of the observers of the Eastern and Central European reform experiences, which were based on the standard reform package prescribed by Western economists (Murrell 1995) . 7 For instance, according to Brzeski (1994, p.6 ):
It will be years, in some cases decades, before the Rechtsstaat can create an environment favorable to private activities, especially those involving capital formation. Statutes can be altered easily enough; Western law teams stand by, keen to provide legal expertise. But it will take time for the complementary psychological, social, and cultural changes to take root. Perhaps only demography--a generational succession--can bring about those changes.
Thus what the dismantling of the central planning apparatus and the importing of alien formal institutions did in the transition economies was to create an "institutional hiatus" in the absence of informal institutions that would have supported the effective functioning of the imported formal institutions. In other words, there was neither central planning nor a functioning market economy in the transition economies, and the price of this institutional hiatus was a severe contraction in output and employment that these economies had suffered (Kozul-Wright and Rayment 1995, Ellman 1994) . 8 9 As the country studies in this volume amply demonstrate, the Asian financial crisis is also a consequence of economic reforms that were carried out without the necessary institutional preparation.
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As in the transition economies of the former Soviet Union, financial liberalization created an institutional hiatus as it removed one set of institutions (i.e., government intervention in financial markets) but failed to create new institutions in a timely manner to replace them.
Such an institutional hiatus was perhaps mostly clearly demonstrated in Korea. When restrictions and control measures were removed from the financial markets neither financial institutions nor the supervisory authorities were ready for the newly liberalized financial regime. Financial institutions had not developed expertise in credit analysis, risk management, and due diligence, and they had had little experience in foreign exchange and securities trading and international banking in general. The supervisory authorities were not monitoring and regulating their international financial activities as much as they should have because they were pressured to overhaul the regulatory system to make it more compatible with a liberalized system. They failed to install a new system of prudential regulation needed to safeguard the stability and soundness of financial institutions (Park 1998) .
Another point that we can infer from the studies reported in this volume is that financial liberalization in Asia was influenced more by the so-called Washington Consensus and less by the more nuanced approach to financial reform that had been developing in academic writings.
11 In fact, the influence of the Washington Consensus continued even after the crisis when it dictated policy requirements to the crisis countries. As remarked by Bergsten (2000) , "[i]t was the 'Washington consensus' that guided the responses of all those crucial actors and therefore dictated policy requirements to the crisis countries. The pictorial symbol was of course the colonial posture assumed by the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund as the President of Indonesia, with the world's fourth largest population, signed his diktat."
The Washington Consensus, which began to emerge among the multilateral and other policy institutions centered in Washington D.C. in the early 1990s, was representative of their focus on stable macroeconomic policy as the most important policy for economic development. It consisted of, as defined by Williamson (1994) , fiscal discipline, appropriate public expenditure priorities, tax reform, financial liberalization, appropriate exchange rate policy, trade liberalization, abolishment of barriers to foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, and property rights.
With regard to financial liberalization Williamson very much followed the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis; that is, to establish a financial regime in which interest rates are market-determined and credit allocation is free of government intervention. A testament to how strongly the Washington Consensus affected the thinking of some policy-makers of the West can be found in Williamson's assertion that, " [t] he Washington Consensus should become like democracy and human rights, a part of the basic core of ideas that we hold in common and do not need to debate endlessly" (1998; 111).
If there is one important lesson that we have learned from the Asian crisis, it is that building a free market economy takes more than removing government intervention from markets. Granted that many of the government interventions may have been misconceived and ill executed, some of them might have been introduced to supplement absent or underdeveloped markets. Removing government intervention in the latter case would be a mistake if it were not preceded with the establishment of preconditions for a well-functioning market. Finding what these are and how to establish them is a challenge for those who champion the free market system and economic prosperity that comes with it.
